FORGET transatlantic rifts about trade, Iraq, Kyoto, or the International Criminal Court. These have been thoroughly ventilated. One area of difference has not got the attention it deserves: demography. It may prove the most important of all.

For 50 years, America and the nations of Western Europe have been lumped together as rich countries, sharing the same basic demographic features: stable populations, low and declining fertility, increasing numbers of old people. For much of that period, this was true. But in the 1980s, the two sides began to diverge. The effect was muted at first, because demographic change is slow. But it is also remorseless, and is now beginning to show up.

America's census in 2000 contained a shock. The population turned out to be rising faster than anyone had expected when the 1990 census was taken. There are disputes about exactly why this was (more on that shortly). What is not in doubt is that a gap is beginning to open with Europe. America's fertility rate is rising. Europe's is falling. America's immigration outstrips Europe's and its immigrant population is reproducing faster than native-born Americans. America's population will soon be getting younger. Europe's is ageing.

In 1950, Western Europe was exactly twice as populous as the United States: 304m against 152m. (This article uses the US Census Bureau's definition of “Europe”, which includes all countries that were not communist during the cold war. The 15 countries that make up the European Union are a slightly smaller sample: they had a population of 296m in 1950.) Both sides of the Atlantic saw their populations surge during the baby boom, then grow more slowly until the mid-1980s. Even now, Europe's population remains more than 100m larger than America's.

In the 1980s, however, something curious began to happen. American fertility rates—the average number of children a woman can expect to bear in her lifetime—suddenly began to reverse their decline. Between 1960 and 1985, the American fertility rate had fallen faster than Europe's, to 1.8, slightly below European levels and far below the “replacement level” of 2.1 (the rate required to keep the population steady). By the 1990s American fertility had rebounded, rising back to just below the 2.1 mark.

Nobody quite knows why. Some of the recovery was the result of higher-than-average fertility among immigrants. But not all of it: fertility rose among native-born whites and blacks as well. Perhaps the most plausible, if unprovable, explanation is that higher fertility was the product of the economic boom of the 1990s combined with what one might call “social confidence”: America was a good country to bring more children into.

Meanwhile, Europe's fertility continues to fall. Having been just below 1.9 in the mid-1980s, the rate is now less than 1.4 and it is projected to continue declining for at least another ten years. In some countries—Spain, Italy and Greece—the fertility rate has fallen to between 1.1 and 1.3.

But what is striking about the American rate is not that it rose and fell, but that it rose so much—to within a whisker of the replacement level. And what is striking about the European rate is that it fell so far, to a much lower level than America's. That is also a reason for thinking it may not recover as strongly as America's did.

The UN reckons that the differences in fertility between America and Europe will continue over the next few decades. America's high rate is expected to remain relatively stable. Europe's should recover a bit—but it will not close the gap. The result of these differences, already evident in the census of 2000, will then become starker.

Absolute Numbers

America's population should have been 275m in 2000. At least, that is what the central projection of the 1990 census predicted. The 2000 census showed it was actually 281m, higher even than the “high series” projection from 1990. Some of this may have been caused by things other than population change: improvements in counting, for instance. But not all. The new census showed that immigration was higher than expected, and that the birth rate of native-born Americans was up too.

But assume, for a minute, that Americans remain, as they are now, about one-third richer per head than Europeans. The high-series projection implies that America's economy in 2050 would still be more than twice the size of Europe's—and something like that preponderance would still be there even if you assume that by then much of Central and Eastern Europe will have joined the EU. The balance of global economic power would be tilted in fundamental ways. With 400m-550m rich consumers, the American market would surely be even more important to foreign companies than it is today. And if so, American business practices—however they emerge from the current malaise—could become yet more dominant.

And They Still Come

Part of the rise in the population has been driven by higher fertility. The rest comes from immigration. In the past decade, America has taken in over 11m immigrants. That compares with 6m in the 1970s and 7m in the 1980s. The real number of new immigrants may be even higher, since these figures may not account for all the estimated 8m-9m people who have slipped illegally into the country. Some may return home. Others may be thrown out. But those that remain contribute to the growing population both directly and indirectly (that is, through their children). The fertility rate for non-hispanic whites is just over 1.8, for blacks 2.1. For Latinos, it is nearly 3.0—higher than in many developing countries. From the point of view of the overall population, therefore, higher immigration counts twice over.

That is a reason why America's total population will continue to rise, though perhaps not as much as the highest estimates suggest. Many of the new migrants come from Mexico. If Mexico's own demographic pattern, with fast-falling fertility, is anything to go by, the fertility rate for American Latinos is also bound to fall, though it will still be quite high.

The Young World and the Old

Higher fertility rates and immigration produce not only a larger population but a society that is younger, more mixed ethnically and, on balance, more dynamic. The simplest expression of this is median age (by definition, half of the population is older than the median age, and half younger). According to Bill Frey, a demographer at the University of Michigan, the median age in America in 2050 will be 36.2. In Europe it will be 52.7. That is a stunning difference, accounted for almost entirely by the dramatic ageing of the European population. At the moment, the median age is 35.5 in America and 37.7 in Europe. In other words, the difference in the median age is likely to rise from two to 17 years by 2050.

Behind this change lie demographic patterns with big policy implications. The percentage of children in the population is falling as populations age. But in America it is falling more slowly than elsewhere. In 1985, America and Europe had more or less the same proportion of the population under 14 years of age: around 20%. By 2020, the proportion of children in Europe will have slumped to 13.7%. In America it will still be 18.6%—not only higher than in Europe but higher than in China and Japan, as well.

That is a problem in its own right, and a source of another long-term difficulty in the transatlantic relationship. Since the end of the cold war, Europe and America have made different calculations about where to spend public money. America has put more into defence; Europe has spent more on social programmes.

If Europeans are unwilling to spend what is needed to be full military partners of America now, when 65-year-olds amount to 30% of the working-age population, they will be even less likely to do more in 2050, when the proportion of old people will have doubled. In short, the long-term logic of demography seems likely to entrench America's power and to widen existing transatlantic rifts.

Perhaps none of this is altogether surprising. The contrast between youthful, exuberant, multi-coloured America and ageing, decrepit, inward-looking Europe goes back almost to the foundation of the United States. But demography is making this picture even more true, with long-term consequences for America's economic and military might and quite possibly for the focus of its foreign policy.

Population Syllabus